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Although the United States has extradition treaties with many na-
tions, the United States often chooses to circumvent these formal extra-
dition processes to obtain jurisdiction over fugitives. ' Government offi-
cials enter the country where a fugitive resides and forcibly abduct that
individual, bringing him or her to the United States for trial.2 United
States courts accept this method of extradition3 and the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine condones it as well.4
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues of
International and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 6-7 (1988). Extradition treaties
often impose certain requirements on the requesting country that must be fulfilled
before and individual is surrendered. Id. at 6. For example, many extradition treaties
require that: (1) the crime charged exist in the penal codes of both nations: (2) the
requesting country prove through sufficient evidence that the accused committed the
crime; (3) the accused will not be tried twice for the same crime; (4) a country is not
compelled to turn over its own nationals; and (5) countries do not have to surrender
individuals accused of political offenses. Id.; see also, M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION 189 (1987) (describing the problems arising from extradition
requirements).
2. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (discussing kidnapping as an alter-
native to extradition); see also M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 189 (explaining the
numerous irregular methods utilized by states to apprehend fugitives abroad).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 433(2) comment b, c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 3D] (describing the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and noting that the majority of United States courts follow it);
see also infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (discussing acceptance by United
States courts of the abduction method of obtaining jurisdiction).
4. See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text (discussing the cases making up
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and their evolution).
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The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine allows the United States government to
circumvent extradition treaties, purportedly in the interest of justice.,
Since the inception of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, however, the degree of
government misconduct has increased dramatically, 6 and courts have
exhibited their tolerance for such activity.7 Because of the potential for
abuse and instances of actual misconduct, action is necessary to pre-
serve the integrity of the United States legal system and principles of
international law.
8
In the fall of 1989, the United States seized and arrested Panama-
nian General Manuel Noriega.9 The United States invasion of Panama
in the Fall of 1989 effectuated his abduction.10 The abduction of
Noriega highlights the legal and ethical problems associated with the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine."1
This Comment analyzes the problems that arise from the application
of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and suggests feasible alternatives. Part I
traces the evolution of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and discusses excep-
tions that courts have developed to restrict its scope. Part II examines
the arguments Noriega utilized in his attempt to convince the District
Court of Florida that his seizure was beyond the realm of acceptable
conduct under the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. Part III argues that the Dis-
trict Court of Florida erred by failing to exercise its supervisory powers
to divest itself of jurisdiction over Noriega and by invalidating the pre-
mise of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. Part IV suggests that the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine is inconsistent with the current trend of respecting interna-
tional law principles and humanitarian rights, and therefore strict ad-
herence to extradition procedures or enhanced judicial supervision of
5. Note, Federally Sponsored International Kidnapping: An Acceptable Alterna-
tive to Extradition?, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1205, 1205 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Interna-
tional Kidnapping].
6. See also RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 3, at § 433 (2) comment c (1987) (ex-
ploring limitations on government misconduct that courts have tolerated); infra notes
64-77 and accompanying text (quantifying the growing trend of judicial tolerance of
the actions of the United State government).
7. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 199, 212 (noting that abductions increased
as a result of permissive court decisions). These decisions created a trend toward al-
lowing the police to make their own arrangements, regardless of the requirements of
the legal system and in complete avoidance of the judicial authorities. Id.
8. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (discussing the abuse inherent in
kidnapping activities and the potential international ramifications).
9. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, Continued, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 444, 490 (1990).
10. See infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (recounting the details of the
invasion of Panama and subsequent abduction of Noriega).
11. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 491; see also Johnston, U.S. Aide Hints at a Deal
if the General Tells All, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at A12 (speculating that Noriega's
abduction would not cause any problems for his prosecution).
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abduction activities should replace the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. This Com-
ment concludes that the United States must abandon the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine in order to conform to the growing demand for global respect
of international law.
I. UNITED STATES ABDUCTION LAW
Extradition is the internationally accepted method of obtaining cus-
tody over individuals who are accused of crimes in one country but seek
refuge in another.1 2 The formal process of acquiring personal jurisdic-
tion often frustrates United States law enforcement officials, however,
because it requires an extradition treaty between the United States and
the country harboring the accused.13 United States officials also com-
plain that achieving custody through extradition is frustrating because
extradition is time-consuming, costly, complex, and often ineffective. 4
As a result, law enforcement officials increasingly use alternatives to
extradition by treaty to gain jurisdiction over accused persons. 15 These
alternatives include using United States officials to abduct the accused
without the knowledge or authorization of the asylum state, or using
officials of the asylum country to seize the accused for "informal sur-
render" to United States agents."6 Although these methods cause inter-
12. Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1206. The Treaty of Amity
between the United States and Great Britain was the first extradition treaty the United
States signed. Id. at 1206, citing n.7, Commerce and Navigation, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No.
105 (November 19, 1794).
13. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) (stating that
an individual cannot be extradited absent an extradition treaty authorizing such action
in the circumstances presented); see also Note, International Kidnapping, supra note
5, at 1206 (observing that nations authorize extradition only when required to do so
under a mutual extradition treaty).
14. Note, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of United
States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1294 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Drug Diplo-
macy]; see also Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1206-09 (enumerat-
ing problems inherent to the formal political offense exception to the extradition pro-
cess, allowing states to refuse to extradite individuals involved in crimes which are
uniquely political in character).
15. M. BASSIOUNt, supra note 1, at 189.
16. Id. "[K]idnapping appears as an attractive, expedient alternative means" of
bringing fugitives to justice, particularly terrorists. Note, International Kidnapping,
supra note 5, at 1209.
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national tension,'17 American courts frequently uphold personal jurisdic-
tion where the United States government takes such action. 8
A. THE Ker-Frisbie DOCTRINE AND ITS PROGENY
For over a century, United States federal courts have addressed the
issue of whether to allow the prosecution of a criminal defendant who
was forcibly abducted by United States officials or their foreign
agents.' 9 Despite varying circumstances of each of the cases consid-
ered,20 the rule of male captus bene detentus governs virtually all of
the decisions.2 This rule dictates that criminal jurisdiction is not de-
feated because a court achieves in personam jurisdiction over the ac-
17. See e.g., United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990)
(finding the court's jurisdiction invalid after Mexican officials protested that the abduc-
tion violated United States-Mexico extradition treaty); Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304
(1Ith Cir. 1987) (involving a Canadian protest against the United States where United
States citizens abducted a fugitive, but holding jurisdiction was valid due to non-partic-
ipation of authorized United States agents). For a detailed discussion of the Jaffe case,
see Lewis, Unlawful Arrest: A Bar to the Jurisdiction of the Court, or Mala Captus
Bene Detentus: Sidney Jaffe: A Case in Point, 28 CRIM. L.Q. 341, 341 (1986).
The United States is not the only country that abducts fugitives and risks interna-
tional outrage. The most significant example is the abduction of Nazi war criminal
Adolf Eichmann. Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem,
Israel, 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. of Israel 1962) (sitting as a Court of Crimi-
nal Appeal). Eichmann was kidnaped in Argentina, allegedly by Israeli government
agents who returned him to Israel for prosecution. Id. In ruling that it had valid juris-
diction over Eichmann, the Israeli district court cited legal precedents of other nations,
particularly the United States Supreme Court holding in Ker v. Illinois, 199 U.S. 436
(1886). Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 68-70; see Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Ju-
risdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in International
Law, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1108-09 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction] (discussing the decision in Eichmann). Argentina, a member of the United
Nations, waived its right to demand Eichmann's return and instead accepted Israel's
formal apology. Lewis, supra, at 344.
18. Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1209.
19. See Findlay, supra note 1, at 46 (tracing the debate of the Ker case back to
1886).
20. Compare Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 256 (7th Cir.) cert. de-
nied - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990) (holding jurisdiction valid where United
States marshals severely beat and burned defendant with a stun gun during his abduc-
tion) with United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231-32 (11th Cir.), reh'g de-
nied, 801 F.2d 378 (1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987) (holding juris-
diction proper where Colombian officials expelled the accused and made no claims of
egregious conduct by United States officials).
21. See M. BASSlOUNI, supra note 1, at 201 (noting that Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952)
together hold that criminal jurisdiction is not impaired even though in personam juris-
diction is obtained through illegal methods); Drug Diplomacy, supra note 14, at 1296-
97 (stating that courts have consistently held jurisdiction valid notwithstanding the ir-
regularity of the abduction, except in the case of United States v. Toscanino); see infra




cused in an illegal manner. 2  The Supreme Court adopted this rule in
two landmark decisions, Ker v. Illinois (1886)23 and Frisbie v. Collins
(1952),24 which together form the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine.2
In Ker, the defendant, indicted for larceny and embezzlement in Illi-
nois, took refuge in Peru.26 The Governor of Illinois then obtained a
warrant requesting the extradition of the defendant .2 Accordingly, the
United States sent an agent to Peru and demanded that the Peruvian
authorities surrender the defendant.2 8 Rather than serving the warrant,
however, the United States agent "forcibly" arrested Ker and returned
him to the United States for trial.29
Ker claimed that his abduction violated the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of due process 30 as well as the United States-Peru extradi-
tion treaty.31 The Supreme Court rejected Ker's arguments and al-
lowed him to be prosecuted in Illinois.3 2 In dicta, the Court elaborated
by stating that extradition treaties are solely for the benefit of the con-
22. Findlay, supra note 1, at 46.
23. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
24. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
25. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 201; see also Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 17, at 1106 (noting that the United States federal courts of appeals
adhere to the rule set out in Frisbie and Ker despite criticism of the Ker-Frisbie Doc-
trine); M. BAssiouNI, supra note 1, at 205 n.49 (listing state and federal decisions
following the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
26. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-38.
27. Id. at 438.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
31. Ker, 119 U.S. at 439. Ker also asserted that the extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru afforded him a right of asylum in his Peruvian residence with
regard to the crime committed in Illinois. Id. at 441. He claimed that his removal from
Peru had to conform with the treaty provisions and that this right was one he could
assert in a United States court because his kidnapping was unlawful and unauthorized.
Id.
32. Id. at 444. The Ker Court stated that when the defendant is charged in a regu-
lar indictment, "mere irregularities" in the method by which the defendant was taken
into custody and placed within the court's jurisdiction are not grounds for dismissal
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 440. Regarding the alleged treaty violations,
the Court stated that the extradition agreement did not entitle a party fleeing from a
crime in the United States to foreign asylum. Id. at 442. Rather, the Court held that
the treaty only regulates the manner by which a criminal is returned to the United
States from an asylum country. Id. In the Ker case, the United States agent had re-
ceived the necessary papers to procure extradition. Id. Because the papers were never
presented in Peru, however, and no steps were taken in accordance with those papers,
the agent's seizure of Ker and delivery to Illinois was not a violation of that treaty. Id.
at 442-43.
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tracting states and are not individually enforceable by the defendant
attempting to strip the court of jurisdiction.
33
Frisbie v. Collins reaffirmed the Ker decision sixty-six years later.',
In Frisbie, the defendant, who was residing in Chicago, was allegedly
kidnaped by Michigan officers, handcuffed, "blackjacked," and taken
to Michigan to stand trial for murder.35 Following his conviction, the
defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that the conviction
was a nullity because his abduction violated both the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the Federal Kidnapping Act." In a
forceful opinion rejecting the defendant's claim, Justice Black, speak-
ing for a unanimous Court, restated the rule that the forcible abduction
of a fugitive will not invalidate a court's jurisdiction over that individ-
ual." Justice Black found no compelling reason to overrule existing
case law and no constitutional provision that required a court to allow a
guilty individual to escape justice merely because he was brought into
the jurisdiction against his will.
3 8
Thus, under the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, a constitutionally fair
trial satisfies the constitutional right to due process, and the
government's ability to seize suspects out of the country is not limited,
even when the abduction offends international law. 3' Although numer-
ous members of the legal profession criticize the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine, 0 a series of unwavering decisions of United States federal"
33. Id. at 443. But see, Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 462-64 (claiming the extradi-
tion ruling in Ker was wrong because on the same day in United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407, 407 (1886), the Court concluded that individuals could invoke the pro-
tections of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842).
34. 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
35. Id. at 520.
36. Id. The Court in Frisbie held that the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1201 (1988), did not bar a state from trying persons who United States agents forcibly
brought within its jurisdiction. Id. at 523.
37. Id. at 522.
38. Id.
39. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 201.
40. See e.g., id. at 190 (stating that abductions erode international law); Note,
Drug Diplomacy, supra note 14, at 1298 (noting that critics assert that the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine violates due process rights and abrogates international human rights, which
have greatly expanded since these decisions).
41. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 256 (involving abduction and torture
of defendant from Honduras by United States marshals with the cooperation of Hon-
duran special troops); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986)
(addressing the abduction of a defendant by United States officials after his expulsion
by Colombian officials); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11 th Cir.) reh'g de-
nied 749 F.2d 733 (1984)(en banc) cert. denied sub nom, Yamanis v. United States,
471 U.S. 1100 (1985) (examining the alleged kidnapping of the defendant from Hon-
duras by American officials); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981)
(examining an American official's kidnapping of a defendant from Peru); United States
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and state42 courts perpetuates the Doctrine's principles. Such persua-
sive and consistent precedent provides the government great incentive
to utilize regularly the practice of abduction.
4 3
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE Ker-Frisbie DOCTRINE
Since the development of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, only one court
has attempted to monitor government behavior in international kidnap-
ping for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in a criminal prosecu-
tion." In United States v. Toscanino,15 the Second Circuit held that
the government cannot exploit the fruits of its own illegal conduct.
4
1
The court stated that jurisdiction over a fugitive is invalid where it was
obtained from government actions which deliberately, unnecessarily,
and unreasonably invaded a person's constitutional rights.4
In Toscanino, the United States charged the defendant and four
other individuals with conspiracy to import narcotics into the United
States.4 On appeal from his conviction, Toscanino argued that prior
judicial proceedings were invalid because United States agents illegally
secured his physical presence before the court.49 Toscanino alleged that
the United States agents kidnaped him from Uruguay, knocked him
unconscious, tortured him incessantly, deprived him of nourishment for
lengthy periods, drugged him, and finally brought him to the United
States for trial approximately three weeks later3 0 The Supreme Court
invalidated the lower court's jurisdiction stating that the rules articu-
lated in Ker and Frisbie could not be reconciled with subsequent Su-
v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976) (involving abduction of defendant from Panama
by United States officials working with Panamanian agents); see also M. BASsIOUNI,
supra note 1, at 205 n.49 (finding that U.S. courts generally adhere to the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine and presenting a list of cases in which the federal courts assumed jurisdiction
over abducted defendants).
42. M. BAssiOUNI, supra note 1, at 205 n.49 (listing state cases that followed the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
43. See Note, Drug Diplomacy, supra note 14, at 1294-95 (referring to a 1989
legal opinion issued by Assistant Attorney General William Barr allowing the FBI to
kidnap alleged criminals outside the United States without that country's authoriza-
tion, which reversed a 1980 legal opinion of the Carter Administration).
44. Findlay, supra note 1, at 48.
45. 500 F.2d 267 (1974).
46. Id. at 272.
47. Id. at 275.
48. Id. at 268-69.
49. Id. at 269.
50. Id. at 269-70.
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preme Court decisions expanding due process to protect an accused
from pretrial illegality.51
Soon after Toscanino, the Second Circuit limited that case's holding
by reconciling the divergent decision with Ker-Frisbie. In United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler52 the defendant was charged with conspiracy
to import and distribute a large quantity of heroin. 53 An individual co-
operating with United States authorities allegedly lured Lujan, a pilot
residing in Argentina, into Bolivia.5 Upon his arrival, Bolivian police
took Lujan into custody"5 and prohibited him from communicating
with an attorney, his family, and the Argentine embassy." Bolivian of-
ficials never formally charged the defendant, and the United States did
not initiate extradition proceedings. 57 Instead, United States officials
forcibly transported Lujan to New York. 58 Relying on the decision in
Toscanino, the defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that
his abduction was a violation of due process, and thus, jurisdiction was
improper.59
Narrowing the applicability of Toscanino, the Second Circuit held
that where the defendant does not state that he was subjected to "tor-
ture, terror, or custodial interrogation," there is no violation of due pro-
cess."0 Additionally, the court stated that the defendant lacked standing
to assert an international law violation because neither the Bolivian nor
Argentine governments protested the abduction."
51. Id. at 275; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (interpreting
the due process clause to require the application of the exclusionary rule in state prose-
cutions); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 179 (1952) (broadening the interpretation
of due process to invalidate a decision relying on evidence obtained through police bru-
tality); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 471 (1963) (holding that evidence
obtained through an unlawful arrest is not admissible).
52. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
53. Id. at 63.
54. Id.
55. Id.




59. Id. at 62.
60. Id. at 66.
61. Id. at 66-67. In Ker, the Court held that an individual could not assert treaty
violations because only nations have rights under the treaty. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442-43.
In contrast, on the same day that Ker was decided, the Court held that a defendant
had standing to raise a treaty violation where he had been tried for an offense other
than that for which he was extradited. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 409
(1886). Although Ker is distinguishable from Rausher in that the Court in Rauscher
never applied the extradition treaty, critics believe that the majority in Rauscher held




In both Lujan 2 and Toscanino,63 the courts relied on Rochin v. Cali-
fornia."s Rochin allows judicial intervention only to halt government
conduct which is "shocking to the conscience," offensive to a "sense of
justice," or counter to the "decencies of civilized conduct."6' 8 The court
also held that jurisdiction is invalid when the conduct of law enforce-
ment officials is "so outrageous" that due process demanded court in-
tervention.66 In Lujan, the Second Circuit held that the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine did not provide United States officials "carte blanche" to vio-
late the aforementioned standards6 7 in bringing fugitives into the
United States. The court explicitly indicated, however, that some level
of irregularity in the manner by which the defendant arrives in the
jurisdiction is tolerable.68
Using Toscanino and Lujan as precedent, most courts hold that ac-
tions by United States agents taken in the course of an abduction do
not constitute impermissible conduct. 69 In addition, courts will not bar
jurisdiction unless United States agents actually participate in the al-
leged mistreatment of defendants. 0 Apparently, courts abandoned
62. 510 F.2d at 62.
63. 500 F.2d at 273-77.
64. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The Court held that due process demanded the reversal
of a conviction where police officers forced the defendant to have his stomach pumped
after swallowing two capsules of morphine while his home was searched. Id. at 165.
65. 342 U.S. at 169, 172-73. The Court subsequently reaffirmed the "fundamental
fairness" standard. Kinsella v. United States ex. rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246
(1960). Kinsella held that the court-martial conviction of a defendant wife of a soldier
was unconstitutional. Id. at 249.
66. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
67. 510 F.2d at 65.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 263 (declining to adopt Toscanino as
a standard of abuse despite the allegation that United States marshals beat and repeat-
edly burned the defendant with a "stun gun"); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896,
901-02 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that forcing the defendant to lie on the floor of a plane
for thirty minutes while U.S. agents pointed a gun at his head and repeatedly
threatened him was not gross enough conduct to invoke Toscanino); United States v.
Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975) (finding that
Mexican army personnel, acting as paid agents of the United States, did not act egre-
giously enough to fall within the Toscanino exception). But see Matta-Ballesteros, 896
F.2d at 263 (Will, J., concurring) (finding the conduct at issue less egregious than in
Toscanino, but equally as shocking to the conscience, and holding that the possibility
should be left open for reconsideration of the exception).
70. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847
(1975) (finding valid personal jurisdiction where Chilean police tortured the defendant
immediately before United States agents abducted him); see also United States v.
Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976) (maintaining proper jurisdiction where defendant
failed to show United States agents played a "direct role" in torture administered by
Panamanian authorities); United States v. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136, 1137 (S.D.
Tex. 1988) (finding valid jurisdiction and the agent's conduct not shocking where
United States officials solicited assistance of Mexican police to arrest defendant and
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their concern for judicial integrity in favor of their prosecutorial func-
tion. 1 Moreover, these decisions suggest that courts first decide the ac-
cused's guilt and then formulate a decision that avoids applying a legal
rule barring jurisdiction that would allow the defendant to go free.1 2
Critics of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine believe this encourages law enforce-
ment officials to kidnap fugitives. 3
Although many courts acknowledge that certain conduct necessitates
the exercise of its supervisory powers,7 no court has actively asserted
its powers75 since the Toscanino decision. 6 Some courts rationalize
their passivity by explaining that although abductions have the poten-
tial to erode respect for the law, there is no necessity to exercise super-
visory powers 77 because no "pattern of repeated abductions '7 8 exists.
Other courts conclude that existing mechanisms in the judicial system
deter police misconduct. These mechanisms include the financial costs
of operations,7 9 alienation of foreign states,80 the risk that kidnappers
could be prosecuted in foreign states,81 and most significantly, com-
plaints from foreign nations of international law violations and the loss
of international standing.8' In Lujan, the Second Circuit stressed that
witnessed use of "seltzer water treatment" as a method of interrogation but left when
the interrogation became "rough").
71. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 212.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11 th Cir. 1984) (acknowledg-
ing that the Toscanino exception could be applied in some instances at hand); Lira,
515 F.2d at 73 (Oakes, J., concurring) (noting that the government's interest in stop-
ping international drug traffic through the use of repeated abductions invites the exer-
cise of supervisory powers); United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 69
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (leaving open the possibility that conduct
could be so egregious as to nullify jurisdiction).
75. See Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d 255, 260-61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
l, l11 S. Ct. 209 (1990) (tracing the history of rulings since Toscanino).
76. 500 F.2d at 267.
77. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 903 (2d Cir. 1981). Lira stressed the
importance of exercising supervisory powers to preserve respect for the laws, particu-
larly when the government engages in kidnapping. Lira, 515 F.2d at 72-73 (Oakes, J.,
concurring). Justice Oakes also stressed that, "[c]rime is contagious .... To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution." Id. at 72 n.l (Oakes, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)).
78. Reed, 639 F.2d at 903.
79. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 68 n.9.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 262.
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if these mechanisms failed to act as effective deterrents, this conclusion
would be reevaluated.
83
Since Toscanino, the Supreme Court has firmly adhered to the Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine and has rejected numerous opportunities to reconsider
the Doctrine's scope. 4 Recent actions of United States officials in the
course of abducting fugitives, however, reveal a profound need for the
Supreme Court to address the rationale of the Toscanino decision and
its qualifications.8 5
II. THE NORIEGA CASE: ARGUMENTS FOR A KER-
FRISBIE EXCEPTION
The United States invasion of Panama and abduction of General
Manuel Noriega once again subjected the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine to re-
newed domestic and international legal criticism. 8 The invasion began
83. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 68 n.9. According to critics, however, these mechanisms are
failing and in fact, the long line of decisions favoring Ker-Frisbie actually encourages
abductions to obtain jurisdiction. See M. BAssIOUNI, supra note 1, at 212 (noting that
the string of pro-Ker-Frisbie decisions encourages law enforcement officials to utilize
the abduction alternative).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987) (adhering strictly to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and
rejecting the exception in Toscanino); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 987 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) (adopting the Supreme Court's strict adhcr-
ence to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine despite criticism of the Doctrine); United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979) (stating that a
defendant may not defeat the court's jurisdiction by asserting the illegality of his
arrest).
85. See generally, M. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 190, 212 (noting the growing
importance of respect for international law and the fact that recent court decisions
encouraged the practice of abductions); Lewis, supra note 17, at 368 (stating that in
terms of international kidnapping for jurisdiction, "[court] analysis of domestic need
ought not transcend national government assessment of international obligation");
Lowenfeld, supra note 7, at 461, 467 (arguing that the values reflected in the Ker
decision are substantially different from the values of today and, thus, the Ker decision
should not be regarded as the final word on the subject of kidnapping, given the signifi-
cant changes in the application of the fourth and fifth amendments and the perception
of human rights internationally); Note, Drug Diplomacy, supra note 12, at 1298, 1300
(recognizing that the rights of individuals under international law evolved substantially
since the Ker and Frisbie decisions and noting that other countries have expressed dis-
satisfaction with United States policy); Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 10,
at 1215 (claiming that because no United States federal statute recognizes kidnapping
as a legal alternative to extradition, the United States should adopt the international
law prohibition on kidnapping into our domestic law, in accordance with the Paquette
Habana case, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
86. See generally, Maechling, Washington's Illegal Invasion, 79 FoREIGN POLY
113, 121 (1990) (characterizing the United States' justification for the invasion-the
need to seize Noriega for violation of United States anti-narcotics statutes -as "aston-
ishing" and violative of state sovereignty); Nanda, Agora: U.S. Forces in Panama: De-
fenders, Aggressors, or Human Rights Activists? 84 Abi. J. INT'L L. 494. 502 (1990)
(noting that the American invasion was not mitigated by the fact that Nuriega A
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on December 20, 1989, when President Bush ordered 24,000 American
troops into combat in Panama. 7 This action followed the December 15,
1989 Panamanian National Assembly's proclamation of Manuel
Noriega as "maximum leader" of the Panamanian government and
Noriega's subsequent declaration of a state of war between the United
States and Panama.88 The military attack purportedly resulted in the
death of twenty-six Americans and more than 700 Panamanians, pri-
marily civilians, as well as "severe and widespread physical devastation,
property damage and dislocation."8 " Noriega, after eluding the United
States in the initial days of the invasion, 90 took refuge with the Papal
charged with an international crime); Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 491 (expressing hope
that in the future the issue of restricting the breadth of Ker-Frisbie is addressed in
"calmer settings"); Brooke, U.S. Denounced by Nations Touchy about Intervention,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at A24. Following the United States invasion of Panama,
many Latin American nations condemned the United States action. Id. The president
of Brazil called the attack "a step backward in international relations." Id. The Cuban
Foreign Ministry described the invasion as "incredible evidence of the disdain of the
United States for international law." Id. The Mexican government issued a statement
saying that it publicly censured Noriega's conduct and reiterated the need to face the
international drug smuggling problem. Id. Nonetheless, the Mexican government stated
that "the combat of international crimes cannot be a motive for intervening in a sover-
eign nation." Id. (emphasis added). Other countries protesting the United States action
in Panama include Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guate-
mala and Nicaragua. Id. The United Nations also "strongly deplored the invasion by a
vote of 75-20, with 40 abstentions" and the Organization of American States de-
nounced the invasion by a vote of 20-1. Maechling, supra, at 125.
87. Maechling, supra note 86, at 121.
88. Id. See generally Nanda, supra note 86, at 496-503 (explaining the back-
ground of the invasion and the reasons for United States action).
89. Nanda, supra note 86, at 497. There are significant discrepancies between the
figures on death and destruction resulting from the invasion. Id. The United States
contends that only 202 civilians died, but Noriega's counsel cites to studies that place
the numbers much higher. Motion to Dismiss Indictment as a Consequence of Conduct
by United States Government Shocking to the Conscience and in Violation of the Laws
and Norms of Humanity, at 2-7, Exhibits A, B, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-79
(S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. For example, The
Independent Commission of Inquiry on the United States Invasion of Panama (March
5, 1990), headed by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, estimated the death toll
at 3,000-4,000 people, mostly civilians, and claims 50,000 people were displaced. Cath-
olic Bishops Emiliani of Darien and Ariz of Colon claim that 3,000 persons died.
Moreover, The Physicians for Human Rights documented more than 300 civilian
deaths, 3,000 casualties, and estimated that 18,000 citizens were left homeless. Motion
to Dismiss, supra, at 2-7. But see Governments Memorandum of Law in Response to
Defendant Noriega's Motion to Dismiss Indictment as a Consequence of "Conduct by
United States Government Shocking to the Conscience and in Violation of the Laws
and Norms of Humanity," at 1-2 United States v. Noriega, No. 88-79 Cr. at 1-2 (S.D.
Fla. filed Mar. 30, 1990) [hereinafter Government's Response] (contending that the
report by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the United States Invasion of
Panama, is "extraordinarily biased and inaccurate in many respects").
90. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al, A12.
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Nuncio in the Vatican Embassy."' Noriega remained there until Janu-
ary 3, 1990 when he surrendered to the United States at the urging of
the Papal Nuncio. 2 United States military officials subsequently ar-
rested Noriega and flew him to the United States for arraignment on a
criminal indictment pending in the Southern District of Florida. 3 This
indictment, handed down in the United States District Court on Febru-
ary 4, 1988, charged Noriega with participating in an international
conspiracy to import cocaine and materials used to produce cocaine
into the United States.94
Capturing Noreiga was one of the four grounds upon which Presi-
dent Bush justified the invasion:9 5 1) to protect American citizens;96 2)
91. See F. KEMPE, DIVORCING THE DICTATOR 398 (1990) (discussing the events
which occurred during Noriega's brief stay at the Nunciatura, otherwise known as the
Vatican Embassy). Noriega arrived at the papal residence shortly after 2 p.m. on De-
cember 24, 1989. Id. at 399. The Nuncio was acquainted with Noriega and was one of
the few people Noriega trusted. Id. at 402. Those familiar with the relationship be-
tween the Nuncio and Noriega were surprised that the United States neglected to
guard the Vatican Embassy after Noriega escaped initial attacks. Id.
92. Id. at 404. United States Secretary of State James Baker sent cables to the
Vatican requesting that the Nuncio turn Noriega over to United States authorities. Id.
at 404. The Vatican, however, refused to become involved and left the decision up to
the Nuncio himself. Id. at 405. American troops unsucessfully attempted to force
Noriega out of the Vatican Embassy with loud rock music and false news reports of
Panamanians supposedly invading the Vatican Embassy to tear Noriega apart "limb-
from-limb." Id. at 406. On January 2, 1990, the Nuncio persuaded Noriega that the
best course to take was to surrender to the United States. Id. at 412. The Nuncio
reached an agreement on behalf of Noriega and the United States, which allowed
Noriega to surrender in full uniform at night in the presence of a general officer. Id. at
414. Noriega turned himself over at 8:44 p.m. on January 3, 1990. Id. at 416.
93. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at Al, A12; see also KEMPE, supra note 91, at 416
(describing the details of Noriega's surrender to the United States).
94. Indictment, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079 Cr. (S.D. Fla. filed Sept.
14, 1988) [hereinafter Indictment]. The Indictment named Noriega and fifteen other
persons in twelve counts. Counts I and II charged RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. §
1962 (c), (d). Id. at 1-24. Counts III, VII and IX charged narcotics conspiracies under
21 U.S.C. § 963. Id. at 24, 26-27, 28. Counts IV, V, VI, and X under 21 U.S.C. § 959
and VIII under 21 U.S.C. § 952 charged substantive narcotics violations. Id. at 25-26,
29. Counts XI and XII charged violations of the Travel Act under 19 U.S.C. § 1952
(a)(3). Id. at 25-26, 29-30; see also N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at A12 (describing the
indictment charges and the circumstances producing the charges).
95. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990 at A12 (reprinting the text of President Bush's
announcement of Noriega's surrender); see generally, Nanda, supra note 86, at 496-
503 (evaluating President Bush's four reasons for the invasion); Maechling, supra note
86, at 122 (discussing whether the United States can reconcile the invasion with its
own treaty commitments and international law).
96. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at A12. The most serious incident that allegedly
triggered the invasion occurred on December 15, 1989. At a roadblock, a Panamanian
Defense Force member killed a United States Marine officer, wounded another, and
beat a third officer and threatened his wife. Nanda, supra note 85, at 497. Following
this incident, an American officer shot and wounded a Panamanian police officer who
was allegedly reaching for his gun. Id.
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to assist in the reestablishment of Panamanian democracy;9 7 3) to pre-
serve the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties;"8 and 4) to obtain
the presence of General Manuel Noriega for prosecution in the United
States.99 A number of sources contend that the United States invaded
Noriega's declaration of war with the United States also constituted a significant
provocation. Maechling, supra note 86, at 497. Additionally, the United States relied
on an unconfirmed intelligence report stating that Noriega planned to initiate an "ur-
ban commando attack on American citizens in a residential neighborhood." Nanda,
supra note 86, at 497. Some critics argue that, viewed in terms of necessity, the situa-
tion in Panama did not constitute a legal justification. Id. Other critics add that the use
of a full scale invasion to counter the above incident was not proportionate to the threat
posed. Maechling, supra note 86, at 124; see also, Nanda, supra note 86, at 497
(doubting the legitimacy of the claim that the invasion was a case of humanitarian
intervention).
97. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at A12. This rationale is premised on Noriega's rise
to power through the use of "strong-arm tactics" and refusing to relinquish his rule
despite the clear opposition of the Panamanian people. Nanda, supra note 86, at 498.
In May 1989, Noriega nullified the election of the opposition candidate for president,
whom the United States supported. Oberdorfer, U.S., Noriega Negotiated Recently,
Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1989 at A37. Despite the dictatorial situation in Panama, how-
ever, "there is no basis in international law for dropping paratroops into another coun-
try in order to change its government, and the O.A.S. Charter expressly prohibits it."
Maechling, supra note 86, at 123. Arguably, military intervention is not an effective
method of encouraging democratic values and may actually inhibit true democratic
development. Nanda, supra note 86, at 499. Both the OAS and the UN rejected the
view that American intervention was justified to promote Panamanian self-determina-
tion, defined by the United States as the right to democratic representation and the
need for the government to respond to the peoples' will. Id. at 500; see also, Maechling,
supra note 86, at 123 (noting that the Panamanian government has never been
democratic).
98. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990 at A12. According to the 1977 Panama Canal Trea-
ties (The Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 10,030 and The Treaty
Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, Sept. 7,
1977, 33 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 10,029, 1161 U.N.T.S. 17798, the United States does,
in fact, carry the responsibility of defending the Canal and is allowed to place troops in
Panama for this purpose. Maechling, supra note 86, at 125. The language of the trea-
ties arguably allows the United States to maintain the stability of the Canal's sur-
rounding political situation. Id. at 125. The United States Senate, however, amended
the Neutrality Treaty upon ratification to clarify that those treaties did not give the
United States the right to intervene in Panama's internal affairs. Nanda, supra note
86, at 501. Because Noriega went to great lengths to avoid giving the United States a
reason to invoke the treaty and never threatened canal operations, this justification for
invasion does not seem to carry much legal validity. Maechling, supra note 86, at 125.
99. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990 at A12. See infra note 92 (discussing the indictment
of Noriega and the need to apprehend him for prosecution as a primary motive in the
United States invasion of Panama). In asserting that Noriega's apprehension was a
rationale for invasion, Maechling believes that:
Bush has elevated a U.S. law-enforcement instrument, a local federal grand jury,
to the status of a secular holy office whose mere accusation is sufficient to un-
leash a posse of 24,000 soldiers to seize a foreign leader in his own capital.
Maechling, supra note 86, at 124.
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Panama primarily to abduct Manuel Noriega so that he could stand
trial in the United States on the above indictment."'
Once Noriega was brought to the United States, his counsel un-
sucessfully 01 promulgated three arguments to support their contention
that jurisdiction over the General was void due to the method of his
apprehension.102 First, Noriega argued that the manner in which
United States officials brought him within the court's jurisdiction was
"shocking to the conscience and in violation of the laws and norms of
humanity."103 Second, Noriega asserted that jurisdiction was invalid
because the invasion of Panama violated international law.10' Finally,
Noriega argued in the alternative that his case represented a situation
in which the court needed to exercise its supervisory powers and bar
prosecution.10 5 The district court's rejection of the first and second the-
ories are well-founded in current case law.106 The facts of the Noriega
case, however, necessitate the exercise of the court's supervisory powers
100. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 490 (arguing that the 1989 invasion of Pan-
ama was undertaken "in large measure" to bring Noriega to the United States for
prosecution). Attempts to use the indictment as a bargaining chip to remove Noriega
from power met with failure. See Hoffman & Woodward, 'It Will Only Get Worse.'
Bush Told Aides, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at A31 (noting that after the October
Panamanian coup attempt the United States government offered not to seek extradition
if Noriega would relinquish power).
Additionally, Panamanian opposition leaders indicated that even in the event of a
successful coup attempt, they would not turn the General over to the United States to
stand trial on drug-trafficking charges. Sciolino, Panama Jinx: What Should Washing-
ton Do about Noriega?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1989, at El. Hints that the United States
would resort to the abduction of Noriega to secure jurisdiction for prosecution surfaced
earlier in the year before the invasion. See Pear, U.S. is Easing Its Terms for the
Ouster of Noriega, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at A9. (stating that President Bush
refused to rule out the abduction of Noriega to bring him to trial on drug-trafficking
charges); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 484 (citing headlines speculating that
because of a change in administration policy allowing the FBI to kidnap alleged
criminals outside the United States, Noriega might be kidnapped). But see infra note
149 and accompanying text (indicating that Noriega's abduction was not a primary
motive for invasion); supra notes 87-90 (discussing validity of other justifications for
the invasion); Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the US. Invasion
of Panama, March 5, 1990 (indicating that Noriega's apprehension was merely a justi-
fication to prepare the American public for the invasion).
101. Omnibus Order, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-79 Cr. at 51-80 (S.D. Fla.
filed June 8, 1990) (hereinafter Omnibus Order).
102. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 8-29.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 20.
106. See Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 51 (rejecting Noriega's arguments
that the method of his abduction was shocking and that the invasion was a violation of
international law).
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in order to restrict the breadth of the Ker-Frisbie rule and prevent fu-
ture government abuse.107
A. THEORY ONE: ABDUCTION OF NORIEGA WAS "SHOCKING TO
THE CONSCIENCE"
Relying upon Justice Rehnquist's statement in United States v. Rus-
sell,108 Noriega argued that the invasion of Panama and his subsequent
abduction presented the court with a situation in which the law en-
forcement agent's conduct was so outrageous that the court must bar
his prosecution for violation of due process.' Noriega compared the
conduct of the United States military to the situation that the Tos-
canino Court considered "shocking to the conscience." ' 10 Noriega did
not contend, however, that the invasion caused a violation of his due
process rights."' Instead, Noriega based his claims on the rights of
third parties with a particular reference to those Panamanian citizens
who were killed, wounded, or suffered property loss as a result of the
invasion."' Noriega claimed that those citizens could not assert their
rights themselves. 1 3
107. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 20 (stating that the Noriega case is
a clear example of the need for the court to exercise its supervisory power because
hundreds of innocent lives were lost in the process of abduction); see also Lowenfeld,
supra note 9, at 491 (observing that it would be ironic and unfortunate if Noriega were
able to launch a successful challenge to the Ker-Frisbie rule). But see Omnibus Order,
supra note 101, at 66-80 (rejecting Noriega's request that the court utilize its supervi-
sory powers because the invasion was not a "pure law enforcement effort").
108. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973).
109. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 8.
110. Id. at 10, 15. Noriega also distinguished his case from cases not controlled by
Toscanino because the conduct alleged was not sufficiently outrageous. Id. at 10. See.
e.g., United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (holding that kid-
napping the defendant at gunpoint was not egregious enough to divest the court of
jurisdiction); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11 th Cir. 1986) (refus-
ing to adopt Toscanino but noting that the arrest and expulsion of the defendant from
Colombia did not shock the conscience).
111. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 25-27.
112. Id.
113. Id. Noriega claimed that case law supported his argument that as the leader
of Panama he had the authority to assert the rights of innocent third parties. Id.; see,
e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (holding that a white vendor was the
only party capable of asserting the rights of blacks where the vendor was sued for
breach of a racially restrictive covenant that denied blacks equal protection); NAACP
v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (allowing the NAACP to assert the
rights of its members by refusing to produce membership lists because litigation would
reveal their identities and violate their freedom of association); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (permitting a physician and birth control official to assert the
privacy rights of the recipients based on the accessorial and professional relationship
between the two parties).
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The district court disagreed with Noriega's contentions.'" 4 The court
rejected the application of Toscanino to Noriega's case because the in-
vasion of Panama did not violate any of his personal rights under the
fifth amendment.115 The court noted that asserting third party rights
was wholly inconsistent with existing case law regarding physical tres-
pass on the defendant's person.116 Additionally, the court rejected
Noriega's standing to assert the rights of third parties because no third
party had an interest in the remedy-the dismissal of Noriega's indict-
ment.11 Therefore, Noriega's theory asserting vicarious due process
claims necessarily failed to bar jurisdiction.' 18
B. THEORY Two: ABDUCTION OF NORIEGA VIOLATED
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Noriega's second contention was that the invasion of Panama vio-
lated international law.11 9 Specifically, Noriega asserted that the inva-
sion violated international treaties and principles of customary interna-
Noriega argued that the injured Panamanians were unable to assert their rights be-
cause United States courts would not consider claims submitted by or on behalf of
victims of the United States armed forces. See Johnson v. Eiscntragcr, 339 U.S. 763,
789 (1950) (finding it not to be the court's function to consider private suits, especially
by non-citizens, that question the President's decision to send troops abroad).
114. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 80.
115. Id. at 56; see United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (stating that the
due process clause can only be asserted when government conduct violates some pro-
tected right of the defendant). The court noted that the only possible mistreatment
which Noriega could claim for these purposes was the incident in which American
troops blasted loud rock-and-roll music at the Vatican Embassy to force Noriega out of
this refuge. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 57 n.27; see also supra note 92 (dis-
cussing the events which occurred during Noriega's stay at the Vatican Embassy). The
Florida district court concluded,
while there are those who might consider continued exposure to such music an
Eighth Amendment violation ... such action does not rise to the level of egre-
gious misconduct sufficient to constitute a due process violation.
Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 57 n. 27. In making its decision, the court assumed
that Fifth Amendment Due Process rights extend to aliens abroad. Id. at n. 28.
116. Id. at 57-58; see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 267 (1974) (hold-
ing personal bodily torture of defendant during the course of abduction sufficient to
prevail on due process claim); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 165 (1952) (holding
that forcibly extracting evidence by pumping defendant's stomach violated due
process).
117. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 58-59. The Florida district court noted
that third party standing only addresses the issue of who may raise the claim and did
not lead to an expansion of "right or remedy in question" where the claim is upheld.
Id. at 58.
118. Id. at 58.
119. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 15, 24 (explaining why the invasion
of Panama was a violation of international law and how Noriega. as head of state, has
standing to protest the violations).
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tional law including the United Nations (UN) Charter, 2 ' the
Organization of American States (OAS) Charter,1 2' and the Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land."'
Noriega maintained that the treaty violations arising from the invasion
voided the effect of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine.123 In addition, Noriega
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The Charter provides, in pertinent part, that
[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Id.
121. Organization of American States Charter, May 2, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361. The O.A.S. Charter states that
[t]he territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, di-
rectly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or spe-
cial advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized.
Id. art. 20, para. 17, 2 U.S.T. at 2420.
122. Hague Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631
(1907). Article 23(b) declares that "it is especially forbidden. . .[t]o kill or wound
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army." Id. art. 23(b), 36
Stat. at 2301. Article 25 states that "[tjhe attack or bombardment, by whatever
means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."
Id. art. 25, 36 Stat. at 2302.
Noriega also claimed that the invasion violated the Geneva Convention. Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 89, at 20. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. This provi-
sion differentiates between combatants and noncombatants, strictly prohibiting "vio-
lence to life and person," as well as other conduct which would impose unnecessary
suffering on noncombatants. Geneva Convention, supra, at 3116. The Florida District
Court rejected this application because it applies only to armed conflicts which arc
purely domestic in nature, not international. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 64.
Additionally, Noriega claimed that the invasion of Panama violated the Protocol Ad-
ditional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), which condemns and prohib-
its target area bombing. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 21, n.8 (citing U.N.
Doc. a/32/144 Annex 1 (1977)). The court disagreed, however, and noted that Con-
gress expressly refused to ratify the Protocol I because it is "fundamentally unfair and
irreconcilably flawed" and "would undermine humanitarian law and endanger civilians
in war." Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 60, n.32 (quoting S. TREATY Doc. 2,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. iii-iv (1987)).
Finally, Noriega asserted that the invasion violated The Nuremberg Charter. Motion
to Dismiss, supra note 89 at 22-23, n.9 (citing The Nuremberg Charter, Art. 6., i
I.M.T. (Nuremberg) (1945)). Under the Charter, the United States can be held ac-
countable for war crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Motion to Dismiss, supra note
89, at 22, n.9. The Noriega court also rejected this argument by declaring that the
Nuremberg Charter applies only to the conduct of war and has no effect on the right of
the United States to arrest foreign nationals to gain jurisdiction over their crimes. Om-
nibus Order, supra note 101, at 65.
123. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 16, 18. Noriega's counsel cited a number
of cases to support the proposition that the court's power is circumscribed in this case
by treaty obligations. Id. at 16; see e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S, 102, 120-21
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claimed that, unlike most individuals protesting jurisdiction based on
treaty violations,12 he had standing as the leader of Panama. 2 '
The court denied Noriega's request and held that if the offended gov-
ernment fails to object to United States actions, 20 individuals lack
standing to claim violations of international treaties, unless the treaties
are self-executing. 27 The court found that the UN Charter, the OAS
Charter, and the Hague Convention were not self-executing and there-
fore did not give Noriega a private right of action.12 8 Because the rec-
(1933) (holding that adjudication cannot follow the U.S. seizure of a British vessel in
violation of territorial limits set by treaty); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606
(1927) (noting that the Ker decision is inapplicable where a United States treaty is
directly implicated).
124. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259-60 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, - U.S. _ 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990) (noting that where the Honduran sovereign
did not protest defendants abduction from Honduras individuals had standing to chal-
lenge international treaty violations, despite popular protest); United States v.
Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that where United States
agents abducted the defendant from Guatemala the defendant did not have standing to
assert violations of extradition treaties where neither governments protested the kidnap-
ping); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that a
violation of an extradition treaty between the United States and Panama cannot be
asserted by an individual absent Panamanian government protest); United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (explaining that an extradition treaty is not violated where
the country in which an American fugitive was residing failed to protest violation). But
see United States v. Caro-Quintero, No. 87-422 Cr, at 8-9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1990)
(holding that the defendant had derivative standing to protest a violation of an extradi-
tion treaty where Mexico "expressly and adequately" protested the United States ab-
duction); Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270, 277-79 (noting that the abduction of the defend-
ant violated international law and treaties notwithstanding a protest by the Uruguayan
government).
125. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 24, 26-27; see Maechling, supra note 86,
at 127 (acknowledging that before the invasion all major governments, except the
United States, recognized Noriega's government as legitimate, either de jure or de
facto; Lowenthal, In Central America, an Unhappy Legacy Bush Can Undo, Chicago
Trib., Feb. 19, 1989, at C3 (noting that the United States was the only nation to not
recognize Noriega's government); see generally, Note, The Dictator. Drugs and Diplo-
macy by Indictment: Head-of-State Immunity in United States v. Noriega, 4 Co. ,.. J.
INT'L L. 729 (1989) [hereinafter Dictator] (analyzing Noriega's indictment in the con-
text of head-of-state immunity).
126. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 61.
127. Id. at 60. A self-executing treaty bestows individual rights upon citizens of the
signatory state. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979). Therefore
citizens of a country that is a party to a treaty may assert rights accorded by the treaty
in a United States court. Id. These rights enure under a self-executing treaty which is
"a self-imposed limitation of the jurisdiction of the United States and hence on its
courts." Id.; see also supra note 124 (listing decisions holding that unless treaties are
self-executing they bestow rights on a signatory nation, and not on individuals).
128. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 62. The Noriega court noted that these
documents represent "broad principles" meant to govern the conduct of the signatory
states, not to confer "individual or private rights." Id.; see, e.g., Forlova v. Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff's ar-
gument that Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter create rights enforceable by United
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ognized Panamanian government did not protest Noriega's abduction,
he lacked standing to assert treaty violations that would necessitate the
divestment of the district court's jurisdiction.""
Noriega claimed that as head-of-state he could assert treaty viola-
tions on behalf of the Panamanian government.13 0 While the court
found this argument somewhat meritorious, it determined that the con-
tention lacked factual support. 31 The court observed that the United
States government explicitly refused to recognize Noriega's regime as
the legitimate Panamanian government." 2 Noriega's nullification of
the results of the Panamanian presidential elections simultaneous to the
alleged treaty violations further weakened his position . 33 The court
held that because the current Panamanian government, led by Guil-
lermo Endara, did not protest the treaty violations, the court's jurisdic-
tion over Noriega was valid.' 3 4 Because the recognized Panamanian
government failed to object and because Noriega lacked standing as an
States citizens in American courts); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (holding that UN Resolutions do not confer rights upon United States citizens
enforceable in a United States court absent domestic legislation implementing the
resolution).
129. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 63.
130. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 24.
131. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 63.
132. Id.; see also Republic of Panama v. Citizens & S. Int'l Bank, 682 F. Supp.
1544 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (denying Noriega's motion to intervene in an action regarding
Panamanian funds and stating that an agent's unrecognized government may not have
access to United States courts); see also Maechling, supra note 86, at 127 (observing
the United States' contention that the Panamanian Assembly's appointment of Noriega
as "maximum leader" was illegal because National Assemblies installing both the Solis
Palma and Rodriguez governments were appointed in violation of the Panamanian con-
stitution); Note, Dictator, supra note 125, at 729-30 (stating that Noriega, as a mili-
tary dictator, was widely considered the de facto head of Panama even though the
United States consistently refused to officially recognize him as such). The United
States also refused to recognize the Solis Palma government and instead recognized
Devalle as president even after he was dismissed and went into hiding. Maechling,
supra note 86, at 118-19.
Under international law, a government is eligible for recognition if it "effectively
controls the national territory and . . . [is] willing and capable of meeting its interna-
tional obligations." Id. The method that the government uses to take power is irrele-
vant. Id. at 1195. Applying this test to the Solis Palma government, Solis Palma clearly
had sole control of the state, and there was no indication that the government would
not meet its international obligations. Id. at 119. Thus, the United States' recognition
of Devalle's government was a fiction. Id. at 119.
133. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 63-64; see also, Oberdorfer, U.S., Noriega
Negotiated Recently, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at A37 (tracing the recent history of
Panamanian elections). Observers noted that opposition leader Guillermo Endara won
the May 7, 1989 election. Id. Noriega, however, claimed victory for his candidate,
Rodriguez, and annulled the election on May 9, 1989. Id. Rodriguez was sworn in as
President on September 1, 1989. Id.
134. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 64. Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Arias Cal-
deron, and Guillermo Ford, all front-runners in the May 1989 elections, were sworn in
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individual, the court's refusal to consider whether the United States
invasion was in violation of the treaty provisions was appropriate.13'
C. THEORY THREE: ABDUCTION MERITS THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF
ITS SUPERVISORY POWERS TO INVALIDATE JURISDICTION
Noriega's final theory asked the court to exercise its supervisory
powers to divest itself of jurisdiction.'36 Although the court rejected
this theory, this was Noriega's strongest argument for circumventing
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine."'7 In fact, the Noriega court should have ex-
ercised its supervisory powers and nullified its jurisdiction to deter fu-
ture governmental misconduct in the acquisition of personal jurisdiction
over criminal defendants.1 38
Supervisory powers provide a means to preserve judicial integrity
and to prevent courts from aiding government impropriety. 13 By exer-
as president and vice-presidents, respectively, at a United States base immediately
before the United States invasion. Maechling, supra note 86, at 122.
135. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 64; see also Government's Response,
supra note 89, at 4-9 (offering support for the court's conclusion that Noriega lacked
standing to assert the alleged treaty violations).
136. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 18.
137. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 423 U.S.
847 (1975) (Oakes, J., concurring) (noting that the government's repeated use of ab-
ductions to halt international drug traffic invites court to exercise their supervisory
powers in the interests of "the greater good of preserving respect for law"). But see
United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 903 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that supervisory
powers should not be exercised where the court observes no pattern of abductions).
138. See infra notes 151-78 and accompanying text (explaining how the court
erred in failing to exercise its supervisory powers in Noriega); Lowenfeld, supra note 9,
at 467 (recognizing the need to abandon the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in light of the current
regard for fourth and fifth amendment rights in the United States and international
individual human rights); see also M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1. at 190 (advocating
reform of the extradition process to encourage its use instead of abduction to preserve
respect for international law). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1246 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), rev'd, - U.S. - 110 S. Ct.
1056 (1990) (recognizing that a court may not exercise supervisory powers without "a
clear basis in fact and law for doing so" and noting that concern for overzealous law
enforcement does not require court intervention); United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d
1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985) (asserting that "[p]roper regard for judicial integrity does
not justify a 'chancellor's foot veto' over activities of coequal branches of
government").
139. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 66; see Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1045 (stating
that supervisory powers derive from the constitutional system of checks and balances
necessary to preserve judicial integrity); United States v. Payner. 447 U.S. 727, 744
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining the supervisory power doctrine and its
role in protecting judicial integrity); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332. 340
(1943) (noting that "Uludicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards
of procedure and evidence"); see generally Beale. Reconsidering Supervisory Powers in
Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal
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cising its supervisory powers, the judiciary deters misconduct and reme-
dies injustices not violating the Constitution or a specific statute, but
are nonetheless intolerable as contrary to fairness and justice.14 This is
a severe remedy, however, and should be applied only in cases of the
government's blatant or repeated abuse which "shock the conscience,"
not mere violations of technical rules.1
4
1
To persuade the court to exercise its supervisory powers, Noriega at-
tempted to establish a pattern of abuses by the United States. 4 He
argued that the United States repeatedly abducts fugitives illegally and
consistently ignores the formal extradition process. 4 3 Relying primarily
Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1433 (1984) (tracing the development of the super-
visory power doctrine, theoretically and practically).
140. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 67; see United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d
541, 569 (5th Cir. 1986) (Williams, J., dissenting) (stating that supervisory power is
an "appropriate tool" to mend injustices that are neither constitutional nor statutory
violations). In justifying the need for the court's supervisory powers, the court in Mc-
Nabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942) stated that:
Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judg-
ment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of
cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be
provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic.
Id. at 343; see also infra note 162 (discussing supervisory powers and the role of the
legislature).
141. Omnibus Order, supra note I01, at 67; see United States v. Omni Int'l Corp.,
634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. Md. 1986) (noting that courts should exercise supervisory
powers "sparingly," only where the government's conduct shocks the conscience);
United States v. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. 799, 806 (N.D. I11. 1977) (recognizing that
supervisory powers are a "harsh ultimate sanction" reserved for conduct that shocks
the conscience).
142. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 18-19; Omnibus Order, supra note 101
at 67.
143. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Caro-Quintero, No. 87-422 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10,
1990) (involving abduction of a defendant from Mexico); Matta Ballesteros v.
Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990) (considering the legality of the abduction of a
defendant from Honduras by United States marshals in cooperation with Honduran
special troops); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing the
kidnapping of a defendant from Panama by United States agents); United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11 th Cir. 1986) (addressing the abduction of a defendant
from Columbia by United States officials); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508
(I 1th Cir. 1984) (involving the kidnapping of a defendant from Honduras by United
States agents); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (discussing the
kidnapping of a defendant from Panama by United States officials); United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving the abduction of a defendant from Bim-
ini by United States agents); see also, Taylor Mexico Says Extraditions Are Illegal,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 3 (discussing the Mexican government's outrage over re-
cent cases of illegal extraditions).
Noriega's contention that the United States consistently abducts fugitives instead of
extraditing them is evidenced by the recent change in administration policy which al-
lows United States agents to kidnap terrorists and other alleged criminals from foreign
nations. See Findlay, supra note 1, at 2-3 (considering whether the Reagan administra-
tion's change in policy to enhance law enforcement efforts against terrorists is proper);
Note, Drug Diplomacy, supra note 14, at 1295 (noting the legal opinion of Attorney
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upon the concurring opinion in United States v. Lira,"" Noriega urged
the court to exercise its supervisory powers to preserve "civilized stan-
dards" of the judicial process. 145 Noriega argued that if ever there was
a case requiring the court's intervention to remedy conduct that was
"shocking to the conscience," this was it. 148
The Noriega court ultimately decided against exercising its supervi-
sory powers. 1 The court acknowledged that a violation of a defend-
ant's individual rights is not a prerequisite to the exercise of its super-
visory powers, " 8 but it also noted that the invasion was motivated by
foreign policy goals which deterred the Noriega court from interven-
ing.149 The court concluded that President Bush ordered United States
military officials to arrest Noriega in the course of the invasion of Pan-
ama, and thus Noriega's seizure was a foreign policy objective.1 0 The
court therefore declined to decide if the United States military action
was "shocking to the conscience," which would mandate the exercise of
the court's supervisory powers, because such a determination violated
General William Barr which would permit United States agents to abduct alleged
criminals from foreign states without that country's consent).
144. 515 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring).
145. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 19; see Lira, 515 F.2d at 73 (Oakes, J.,
concurring) (speculating that the court will eventually exercise supervisory powers to
preserve respect for the law in the abductions of alleged drug traffickers). Noriega cited
the hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries resulting from the invasion to support his
argument that the court should exercise its supervisory powers. Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 89, at 20; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the
figures submitted regarding the number of people who were injured, killed, or had
property destroyed as a result of the United States invasion).
146. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 9-10.
147. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 70.
148. Id. at 68; see United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d at 569-71 (discussing the rela-
tionship between supervisory powers and constitutional and statutory law).
149. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 71-72.
150. Id. at 71 n.37. In reaching its decision, the court considered the Government's
analysis of the issue in The Government's Memorandum in Response to Motion to
Dismiss Indictment, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079 Cr. at 3 (S.D. Fla. filed
Feb. 2, 1990), which cited to The Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the
President of the United States (Dec. 20, 1989) (ordering Noriega's arrest "in the
course of carrying out the military operations in Panama"). Omnibus Order, supra
note 101, at 71-72. The court found that Noriega's counsel inadequately refuted the
Government's statement that the invasion was primarily for foreign policy objectives.
Id. at 71. Moreover, the court noted that Noriega erroneously relied upon statements
made by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the United States Invasion of
Panama because that report rejected the theory that Noriega's arrest was a motive for
the invasion. Id.; see Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at Exhibit A, p. I (referring to
the report by the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the United States Invasion of
Panama).
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the political question doctrine. 5' The court, therefore, held that it had
jurisdiction.152
III. WHY THE NORIEGA COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO
EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY POWERS
The Noriega court viewed the facts surrounding the invasion and the
seizure of General Noriega narrowly.153 Hence, the Noriega decision
invites even more serious governmental misconduct and squanders an
opportunity to reconcile conflicts within the United States laws gov-
erning abductions with international legal and humanitarian
standards. 5
A. THE Noriega COURT ERRED IN APPLYING EXISTING DOCTRINE
One of President Bush's four goals in invading Panama was the
seizure and arrest of General Manuel Noriega in order to bring him to
justice in the United States. 55 If the Bush administration claims
151. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 72-73. The political question doctrine in-
volves a category of matters that courts consider the exclusive province of the executive
and legislative branches. Id. at 73. Political questions involve either subjects that are
traditionally beyond the expertise of the judiciary, such as foreign policy, or subjects
better decided by the executive and/or legislature. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
210 (1962) (formulating the test to determine whether an issue involves a political
question). Topics deemed political questions are therefore excluded from judicial re-
view. Id.; see, e.g., Atlee v. Laird, 411 U.S. 911 (1972) (refusing to consider whether
the President has power to maintain United States forces in Southeast Asia); DaCosta
v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (deciding that President Nixon's order to bomb
targets and mine harbors in North Vietnam constituted a constitutionally unauthorized
escalation of war was a non-justiciable political question); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.
Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984) (refusing to decide whether United States military aid and advisors
were introduced into El Salvador under conditions implicating the War Powers Resolu-
tion and the constitutional war powers clause).
152. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 70. The court explained that if the inva-
sion presented a pure law enforcement effort where government agents intentionally
killed and tortured people "for the sole purpose of discovering a fugitive's wherea-
bouts" to effectuate his arrest, it would properly invoke its supervisory powers. Id. In-
stead, the court viewed the Noriega incident as a "military war" in which innocent
lives were sacrificed for foreign policy goals. Id.
153. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 491 (stressing the difference between "true
war" and the "war on drugs"). The "war on drugs" requires adherence to our values of
due process, and it is not subject to the relaxation of governmental restraint often in-
herent to "true war". Id.
154. See id. at 467, 491 (advocating the abandonment of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
in light of society's higher respect for human rights). Lowenfeld notes, however, that it
would be unfortunate if Noriega were the first individual to successfully challenge the
Doctrine. Id.
155. Text of Bush Announcement On the General's Surrender, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4,
1990, at A12.; see supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing President
[VOL. 6:571
KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE
Noriega's apprehension as an independent justification for the invasion
of Panama, a sovereign state, the United States courts should evaluate
it as such.1 " Once Noriega's case is removed from the "foreign policy"
context and placed in the realm of strict law enforcement, the court
can properly exercise its supervisory powers. 1 7 Thus recharacterized,
Noriega's original contentions of governmental misconduct" 8 and dis-
regard for the law of nations,1 59 previously rejected by the court, be-
come viable arguments against the exercise of jurisdiction. 6
The court rejected Noriega's argument that the United States inva-
sion of Panama was "shocking to the conscience," because he could not
show that the misconduct violated his individual rights.' 6 ' The supervi-
sory powers doctrine requires no such showing.16 2 Rather, Noriega need
only establish that the government's actions in effectuating his arrest
were shocking and contrary to public policy.'6 3 The United States inva-
Bush's four objectives); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 9 (claiming that the invasion
was undertaken substantially to bring Noriega to the United States for prosecution).
156. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 491 (stressing that the "war on drugs" should
be considered normal law enforcement subject to normal due process restraints).
157. See id.; see also Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 70 (explaining reasons
how the invasion of Panama could be characterized as a foreign policy objective).
158. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 8 (asserting that the court must
divest itself of jurisdiction because the invasion was "shocking to the conscience").
159. See id. at 15 (alleging that the invasion of Panama and the subsequent arrest
of Noriega violated numerous tenets of international law and several United States
treaties).
160. See United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 569-71 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating
that supervisory powers are designed to correct injustices not falling within the confines
of constitutional or statutory violations but that threaten the integrity of the judicial
system); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (maintaining that judi-
cial supervision is necessary to preserve civilized standards of procedure).
161. See Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 67-68 (explaining that the court must
find that the government repeatedly engaged in outrageous or shocking conduct to em-
ploy supervisory authority where a defendant's personal constitutional or statutory
rights were not violated).
162. See Leslie, 783 F.2d at 569-70 (noting the shift in supervisory authority focus
from violation of defendant's rights to protection of judicial integrity).
163. United States v. Omni Int'l Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. Md. 1986).
The open-ended nature of the supervisory power doctrine led to expansive interpreta-
tions, and courts freely formulate rules meant to promote "the ends of justice and good
public policy." Beale, supra note 139, at 1434. If such a ruling by the court proves
impractical or undesirable, however, the courts or the legislature can easily revise it. Id.
Additionally, no conflict is posed between state and federal courts as a result of super-
visory rulings because these decisions apply only in federal proceedings. ld.: see also
RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 3, at § 433 (stating that where United States or foreign
officials abduct a person and bring him or her to the United States. the United States
cannot prosecute that person if apprehension or delivery was found to be shocking to
the conscience).
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sion of Panama caused staggering damages to that country."0 4 The
court must decide, through the exercise of its supervisory powers,
whether such destruction is justified, even in part, by the desire to bring
a single individual to justice and whether such action is consistent with
public policy. 65
No case involving United States officials abducting fugitives from
abroad approaches the extreme level of interference with a sovereign
state exhibited in the Noriega case. 161 Some observers argue that the
exercise of the court's supervisory powers is unjustified in this case be-
cause there was no repeated governmental abuse.117 Others note, how-
ever, that the consistent toleration of past governmental actions permit-
ted government conduct to deteriorate to the point where an invasion of
a foreign sovereign was condoned simply to bring a fugitive to jus-
164. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting the different estimates of
destruction resulting from the United States invasion of Panama). In the words of
Judge Hoeveler, who presided over the Noriega proceedings,
[d]efendant's counsel makes much of the numbers of innocent civilians killed and
the extent of property damage, but the Court fails to see what that argument
proves; the death of but one woman or man is one too many.
Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 79.
165. Beale, supra note 163, at 1434. Beale notes that
in the absence of congressional action . .. the federal courts should decide evi-
dentiary questions 'in accordance with present day standards of wisdom and jus-
tice rather than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the
past.'
Id. at 1441. But see, supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting that both the
courts and the legislature have the power to revise court decisions based on supervisory
powers if they prove undesirable).
166. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 255 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990) (involving the torture of a single individual
which was not egregious according to the Toscanino standard); United States v. Toro,
840 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1988) (maintaining jurisdiction where defendant was abducted
but alleged no torture); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988) (ad-
dressing the abduction of a defendant who alleged no other governmental abuse);
United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (validating jurisdiction where a
Panamanian jail treated the defendant poorly).
167. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 490-91. See United States v. Omni Int'l Corp,,
634 F.2d at 1438 (stating that courts should exercise supervisory powers in cases where
long-standing government misconduct can be demonstrated). Justice Oakes' opinion in
Lira supports the exercise of supervisory authority for repeated abductions, absent any
suggestion that the abductions must in some way involve torture or other egregious
action. 515 F.2d at 73. In other words, Justice Oakes views the abductions themselves
as the outrageous action which the court needs to curb in order to protect judicial
integrity. Id.
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tice. 68 Consequently, the court must exercise its supervisory powers to
stop this erosion of respect for the sovereignty of other nations.""3
Noriega's argument that the invasion violated international law
should also be reconsidered to the extent that Noriega's arrest was an
independent justification for the invasion of Panama.1 70 The supervisory
powers doctrine does not require that a foreign government protest the
violation of a treaty or international law.171 Rather, the doctrine merely
requires a court to determine that the government's actions were shock-
ing to the conscience, 2 damaging to judicial integrity,7 3 or against
public policy.1 74 If any of these criteria are met, judicial intervention is
justified.7 5
168. See Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 260 (holding jurisdiction valid although
the defendant was severely tortured at the direction of United States Marshals during
abduction). Consistent application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to situations involving
foreign abductions caused a "slippery slope" of misconduct in which the government is
permitted to engage. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 489. Lowenfeld aptly notes that -[als
jurisdiction is believed to expand, so does the drive to exercise it, often without the care
that is observed in domestic law enforcement." Id.
169. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 423 U.S.
847 (1975) (Oakes, J., concurring) (stressing that courts must exercise their supervi-
sory powers to bar jurisdiction in abduction cases because of the government's repeated
abuses in its fight against drugs). As Lowenfeld asserts:
[A]II abduction organized by governments shocks the conscience, not only be-
cause kidnapping is a crime everywhere, but because there is a strong probability
that the very safeguards and professionalism that distinguish civilized police ac-
tion from vigilantism-warrants upon probable cause, prompt arraignment
before a judicial officer, fair interrogation-will be unavailable.
Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 589-90; see also Harris v. United States. 331 U.S. 145,
172 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that "dubious police methods defeat
the very ends of justice by which such methods are justified"). Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the gov-
ernment must be a model for law-abiding behavior in order to preserve judicial
integrity).
170. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 15 (arguing that the arrest of
Noriega constituted a violation of United States treaty and international law
obligations).
171. See Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 60 (explaining that individual claims
of international law and treaty violations cannot be successful without the offended
government's protest, unless the treaty is deemed self-executing)- supra notes 119, 127
(discussing the concept of self-executing treaties with emphasis on abduction cases).
172. See Omni Int'l, 634 F. Supp. at 1438 (finding supervisor) power to be a severe
sanction for conduct which "shocks the conscience").
173. See id. (noting that supervisory powers seek to preserve the integrity of the
judicial system); Leslie, 783 F.2d at 569-70 (stating that supervisory powers are a
method by which erosion of judicial integrity is protected).
174. See Beale, supra note 139, at 1434 (explaining that the courts regularly use
supervisory powers to promote what they believe to be good public policy).
175. See Leslie, 783 F.2d at 571 (indicating when supervisory powers are properly
applied).
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B. THE Noriega COURT SHOULD HAVE USED ITS SUPERVISORY
POWERS TO CHANGE EXISTING DOCTRINE
Abduction, particularly as a justification for an invasion,'17 6 violates
international law. 17 This is true not only in the Noriega case, but in all
other cases of government abduction.' 8 The Noriega court, therefore,
should have divested itself of jurisdiction through its supervisory powers




Abduction of fugitives from foreign nations without that state's offi-
cial consent clearly violates that state's sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity.1 80 As Noriega argued, his forcible abduction from Panama vio-
176. See Nanda, supra note 86, at 502 (asserting that no state has authority to
violate another sovereign's territorial integrity to effectuate the arrest of a fugitive and
therefore United States actions in Panama clearly violated international law); see also
Maechling, supra note 86, at 123 (explaining that the United States' reasons for invad-
ing Panama have no basis in international law). But see D'Amato, Agora: U.S. Forces
in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors, or Human Rights Activists?: The Invasion of Pan-
ama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 520 (1990) (arguing
that the United States invasion of Panama was justified and that international law does
not require a state to give valid international law explanations for its actions); see gen-
erally Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620
(1984) (discussing common rationales for state intervention in international law).
177. See S.C. Res. 138, 15 U.N. SCOR (868th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349
(1960) (noting in its review of the Adolf Eichmann case that foreign fugitive abduction
violates the UN Charter and the rights of sovereign states and warning that such ac-
tions can result in the breakdown of international order); M. BASSIOUNI, supra note I,
at 236 (claiming unlawful seizures violate international law and suggesting sanctions
for offending nations); Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 472-77 (explaining fugitive abduc-
tion from foreign nations encourages violations of the standards of international law).
178. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 472 (arguing that any "exercise of law en-
forcement" by a country on the territory of another is a violation of the foreign state's
sovereignty). But see Findlay, supra note 1, at 52 (supporting abduction of terrorists in
foreign nations due to the unique nature of their threat).
179. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 493 (expressing hope that in the future courts
will consider abduction shocking to the conscience and formulate a new rule emphasiz-
ing international law and humanitarian rights).
180. RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 3, at § 432(2). Section 432(2) of the Restate-
ment notes:
A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of
another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized
officials of that state.
Id.; see also Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in Violation of
International Law Preclude Trial, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 447, 457 (1987) (noting that
the United States has an "international obligation" not to invade another sovereign's
territory to apprehend a fugitive); Findlay, supra note 1, at 16 (noting that abuduc-
tions abroad on the territory of other states amount to "prima facie" violations of a
nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity). The seizure of a fugitive from a foreign
territory does not violate international law if there is no effective government which
could assert its sovereignty. Id. at 17. Examples of this include Lebanon and Germany
during the American occupation after World War II. Id.
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lated Article Two, section four of the UN Charter"'1 and Article
Twenty of the OAS Charter. 82 Both of these Charters condemn states'
actions that breach the territorial integrity of another nation, such as
kidnapping. 183 Additionally, some observers argue that abductions are
particularly inappropriate when an extradition treaty exists between
the two nations, and the formal extradition process is circumvented by
the forcible removal of the defendant to the United States.
1
8
The modern legal trend is to classify illegal foreign abductions as
violations of international human rights law.180 Although no interna-
tional agreements expressly list abductions of fugitives abroad as viola-
tions of international human rights law, the idea is implicit in several
international declarations. 88 Some observers claim that these agree-
181. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4; see supra note 120 (quoting text of Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter); see also S.C. Res. 138, 15 U.N. SCOR (868th mtg.) at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) (observing in its examination of the abduction of Eichmann
that "the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible with the Char-
ter of the United Nations"). But see D'Amato, supra note 176, at 520 (claiming that
the United States invasion did not violate the UN Charter because in order to act
against a state's territorial integrity there must be an intent to annex part or all of that
nation or there must be an exercise of force against the political independence of the
state).
182. Art. 20, para. 17, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2420, T.I.A.S. No. 2361; see also supra note
112 (quoting the text of Article 20 of the Organization of American States Charter).
183. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 (1974) (stating that
abductions of fugitives from a foreign territory violate both the OAS Charter and the
UN Charter, both of which articulate long-standing principles of international law).
184. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 474 (noting that strict adherence to the for-
mal extradition process is not universally accepted but that treaty provisions must be
followed as a matter of international law). The argument that extradition should be the
only process by which a state gains jurisdiction over an individual creates problems in
cases such as Noriega where the government refuses extradition despite a treaty, or in
cases involving terrorists which are often supported by the governments themselves. See
Sciolino, What Should Washington Do about Noriega?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at
El (explaining that even the Panamanian opposition would refuse to turn over Noriega
if he were ousted from power); Findlay, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that "'Libya, Iran,
and the putative government of Lebanon would be as willing to deport terrorists to the
United States as terrorists themselves would be likely to saunter into the nearest Amer-
ican embassy and turn themselves in"). See generally Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Panama, Providing for the Extradition of
Criminals, May 25, 1904, United States-Panama, 34 Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445
(describing the terms of extradition between the United States and Panama).
185. Note, Drug Diplomacy, supra note 14, at 1298; see also M. BASSIotNI, supra
note 1, at 217-44 (discussing the treaties and agreements under which seizure of per-
sons abroad are a violation of international law and human rights).
186. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 474. For example, Article 9 of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, provides that -[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary ar-
rest, detention or exile." G.A. Res. 217. U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). cited in
BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 161-64 (B. Weston.
R. Falk & A. D'Amato ed. 1980) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. Article 9(!) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that "[njo one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except
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ments have no effect because they are not legally binding.187 These
agreements, however, evolved subsequent to Ker and reflect a shift in
societal values toward a more expansive definition and protection of in-
ternational human rights. 188
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States has a duty to foreign nations to respect their terri-
torial sovereignty in obtaining fugitives, as well as a moral responsibil-
ity to guard against breaches of individual rights as defined by interna-
tional agreement.18 9 Repeated violations of these obligations threaten
international stability."' Thus, courts must formulate new standards
for jurisdiction to replace the Ker-Frisbie rule and manifest respect for
international principles. 9
A. ABANDONING THE Ker-Frisbie DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE Noriega CASE
Noriega's abduction presents an extreme example of the United
States government's application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine to obtain
jurisdiction over a fugitive abroad.' 92 Noriega was a powerful and
highly visible representative of the drug world and a notorious blemish
on the United States government's efforts in its "war on drugs."'9 3
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."
BASIc DOCUMENTS, supra, at 201-10.
187. Note, Drug Diplomacy, supra note 14, at 1298.
188. Id.; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 481 (concluding that contemporary
thought views foreign kidnapping as violative of international law and the Ker decision
should, therefore, be reconsidered); Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at
1215-16 (detailing the increased focus, domestically and abroad, on human rights and
stressing that courts should interpret these provisions in international charters as "im-
plicit guarantees" of human rights).
189. Id. at 1214, 1216; see also supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the United States' obligations under international law with regard to fugitive
abductions).
190. Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1216; see also S.C. Res. 138,
15 U.N. SCOR (868th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) (declaring that interna-
tional abductions "affect the sovereignty of a Member State and therefore cause inter-
national friction, [and] may, if repeated, endanger international peace and security").
191. See Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1216 (stating that
"[c]ourts should interpret international agreements and treaties that recognize the invi-
olate territorial sovereignty of the party nations as implicit prohibitions against actions,
such as kidnapping, which fail to respect that sovereignty"); Lowenfeld, supra note 9,
at 467 (expressing need to revise the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine in accordance with modern
standards of international human rights and domestic concern for the mandates of the
fourth and fifth amendments).
192. See supra note 167 (listing abduction cases less egregious than Noriega).
193. See Sciolino, Panama Jinx: What Should Washington Do About Noriega?,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1989, at El (discussing the United States' failure to oust Noriega
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There is little doubt that a move by the district court to divest itself of
jurisdiction in this highly publicized case would have been an unpopu-
lar action.194 Nonetheless, the Noriega case questions whether the Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine is a policy which the United States, as a member of
the United Nations and a leader in the world community, ought to
continue supporting. 19 5 The Noriega case invited the court to exercise
its supervisory powers to begin the process of change."" The court,
however, declined this challenge.
197
B. ALTERNATIVES TO THE Ker-Frisbie DOCTRINE
In the last century, numerous individuals have articulated the
problems arising from the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. 198 Few, however, have
suggested alternatives that would satisfy both the needs of law enforce-
ment officials seeking to bring an accused to justice and the needs of
the accused and the violated countries to be free from illegal intru-
sions.' 9' Given the severity of the situation with regard to international
from power and the refusal of the Panamanian opposition leaders to turn Noriega over
for prosecution on drug-trafficking charges); Pear, U.S. is Easing Its Terms for the
Ouster of Noriega, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at A9 (noting that President Bush
declined to rule out Noriega's abduction).
194. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 491 (recognizing the irony if Noriega, as an
ex-dictator, were to successfully challenge the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and expressing the
need to address the issue in "calmer settings").
195. Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1214; see also Lowenfeld,
supra note 9, at 493 (emphasizing that the United States should create a model rule
prohibiting international abductions and mandating divestment of jurisdiction as a
remedy to such occurrences); M. BAssIOUNt, supra note I, at 190 (stating that "[alt
this stage in the development of international law, it is no longer possible to rationalize
violations of international law on grounds of expediency or to allow such violations to
be perpetuated without an adequate deterrent-remedy").
196. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 89, at 18; see also supra notes 127-43 and
accompanying text (explaining Noriega's reasons for requesting that the court exercise
its supervisory powers to revoke jurisdiction).
197. Omnibus Order, supra note 101, at 79-80; see also supra pp. 13-19 (outlining
Noriega's arguments for nullifying jurisdiction and discussing the court's rationale for
rejecting these arguments). The Noriega case, however, is unlikely to be the last oppor-
tunity that the courts will have to reconsider this issue. See M. BAssIouNi. supra note
1, at 212 (stating that the line of court decisions showing support for the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine encourages more frequent exercise of such practice by United States law en-
forcement officers).
198. See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 1, at I (discussing the problems arising from the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine with regard to the abduction of terrorists from abroad); Rogers,
supra note 180 at 447 (analyzing the ramifications of United States seizures of ter-
rorists abroad); Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 444 (identifying the violations of both
United States constitutional law and international law resulting from application of the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
199. See, e.g., Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1216 (considering
the violation of territorial sovereignty posed by foreign seizures and advocating review
of United States treaty obligations after the accused has been abducted to determine if
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kidnappings, some action must be taken to begin harmonizing United
States laws with the modern concept of world order.200
1. A Ban on International Kidnappings
The United States' disregard for international law, evidenced by ab-
ductions, should "shock the conscience" of today's courts. 0 United
States courts should completely ban kidnapping. 2  This would make
extradition by treaty the only means by which courts could obtain ju-
risdiction.2 0 3 Such action is the best way to approach the internation-
ally sensitive, and potentially explosive, kidnapping problem. 20 4 An ab-
solute ban on kidnapping would also enhance judicial integrity through
a greater sense of respect for the law of foreign nations.20 5
Critics would argue that the extradition process in the United States
is so fraught with difficulties that such a system would prove unwork-
jurisdiction should be refused); M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 236 (discussing possible
remedies for abductions in violation of international law, such as holding the perpetra-
tor internationally responsible, return of the accused and payment for damages, and
payment of reparation to the violated state). The problem posed by these remedies is
that they are not aimed at preventing the damage, outside of a questionable deterrent
effect. See Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1216 (considering the de-
terrent effect of the proposed post-seizure review of jurisdiction under the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine).
200. Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1216; see also supra notes
189-92 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of abductions on the territorial
integrity of foreign nations with emphasis on the Noriega case).
201. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 444 (detailing how international abductions
violate international law, extradition treaties, international human rights, and the
fourth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution and asserting that this
method of gaining jurisdiction should be considered "shocking to the conscience"); see
also supra notes 161-75 and accompanying text (discussing why abductions are shock-
ing to the conscience and violate international law and human rights).
202. Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1215; see also supra notes
65-66 and accompanying text (explaining how the United States courts' treatment of
abductions has encouraged increasing abuse of the rule of law).
203. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 473 (noting that extradition treaties advance
the state's interest in law enforcement and supply safeguards for the individual over
whom jurisdiction is sought).
204. See Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1215 (noting that the
United States courts should include the international-law ban on kidnapping in its na-
tional jurisprudence); Nanda, supra note 86, at 502 (stating that the invasion of Pan-
ama and the subsequent apprehension of Noriega is inconsistent with the principles of
international law).
205. See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 493 (urging the United States, in examining
international abductions, to "look at the uneven practice of other states not as a justifi-
cation for indecent action, but as a challenge to develop--by example and treaty-a
rule worthy to be called international law); M. BAssIoUrNI, supra note 1, at 190 (ex-
plaining that allowing nations to benefit from the practice of illegal abductions "en-
courages further violations and erodes voluntary observance of international laws," by
both states and individuals).
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able, inhibit the apprehension of accused criminals, and thus reduce the
probability that justice will be served.208 In fact, it is likely that the
number of fugitives brought to justice will decline. 20 7 There are many
possibilities, however, for increasing the efficiency of the extradition
process which would alleviate barriers inherent in that system.208 Such
concerns must become secondary to the more compelling interests of
promoting respect for international law and human rights.209
2. Enhanced Judicial Supervision Over International Kidnapping
Because a complete ban on all kidnapping would likely face substan-
tial opposition,10 particularly from law enforcement officials, another
possibility exists that would strike a better balance between the promo-
tion of justice in the United States and respect for the territorial sover-
eignty of other nations." 1 This revision would set aside the outdated
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and require the United States prosecutor to file a
motion with the court requesting permission to abduct an individual
accused of a crime in the United States.
212
Accompanying this request would be affidavits indicating the failure
of formal attempts to obtain jurisdiction and the reasons for such fail-
ures.21 3 The affidavit should also explain why extreme measures, such
206. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (indicating the ineffectiveness of the
formal extradition process as it presently exists).
207. See Findlay, supra note 1, at 7-15 (referring to problems inherent in extradit-
ing terrorists accused of crimes in the United States).
208. See M. BAssIouNI, supra note 1, at 238 (explaining that the current extradi-
tion process is cumbersome and suggesting methods to streamline the system).
209. See Text of President Bush's Address to Joint Session of Congress, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1990, at A20, col. I [hereinafter Bush] (emphasizing the need to
create a "new world order" and abide by the law of nations).
210. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (discussing problems that
could arise if extradition becomes the sole option for law enforcement in the United
States).
211. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of a
system of pure extradition); supra notes 161-72 (explaining the violations of interna-
tional law resulting from application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
212. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (explaining how the breadth of
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine has increased as courts have tolerated police conduct in the
course of seizures abroad and emphasizing that courts must restrict the Doctrine's
scope). This revision may necessitate legislative action to require such a writ of execu-
tion before a seizure. Under the All Writs Act, courts may issue "all writs necessary or
appropriate in aide of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable with the usages and
principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988). Another possible method of implementa-
tion, absent legislative initiative, would require the Court to invalidate the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine in favor of strict use of the extradition process, which would create incentive
for the legislature to adopt this compromise alternative.
213. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the extradi-
tion process is the most agreeable method of obtaining jurisdiction under international
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as seizures, should be resorted to in that particular case.' 4 Finally, in
all cases, the government should prove that the asylum nation acqui-
esced to the territorial violation and the abduction of the accused.216 If
the government is able to meet these burdens, the court should grant a
writ of execution, allowing the United States law enforcement officials
to kidnap the accused from his or her state of refuge."'6 Otherwise,
courts should deny the request and refuse jurisdiction in the case of any
unauthorized seizures,2 17 including those conducted by foreign agents
on behalf of United States officials.
21 8
Although this approach attacks some of the problems related to in-
ternational abductions, some would argue it is a compromise that does
not go far enough. 219 Increased judicial supervision over the process as
suggested above, would significantly advance the concepts of sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, and domestic process.22 0 This strategy, how-
ever, does not attempt to guard against the violation of the individual's
law). The court should examine cases individually to determine whether the rationale
behind the breakdown in the extradition process could be remedied expeditiously, al-
lowing the government to go forward with the extradition. For example, often the gov-
ernment's case is weak at the time the request is made so that the refuge state denies
cooperation. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 238. In such a case, the court should
determine whether development of a stronger case is necessary before a writ may be
obtained.
214. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note I, at 238.
215. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text (stressing the importance of
adopting laws which respect the territorial sovereignty of foreign nations); see also
Note, International Kidnapping, supra note 5, at 1216 (indicating that acquiescence is
a necessary part of ensuring compliance with international law); United States ex. rel.
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (stat-
ing that a state's acquiescence to an informal seizure remedies any problems related to
territorial-sovereignty under international law).
216. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (6th ed. 1990) (defining writ of execu-
tion as "a writ to put in force the judgment or decree of a court. [A] [normal, written
command of a court directing a sheriff or other official to enforce a judgment through
process of execution").
217. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (recommending that courts ex-
ercise greater control over the system which presently condones abduction as an alter-
native to extradition); supra notes 176-88 and accompanying text (explaining that ad-
herence to international law should take precedence over the government's need to
acquire jurisdiction over fugitives abroad).
218. See supra notes 7, 65-66 and accompanying text (expressing the need to con-
trol the acts of United States officials who hire or act in conjunction with foreign
agents to kidnap fugitives).
219. See generally M. BAssIoUNI, supra note 1, at 239 (advocating the streamlin-
ing of the extradition process and dismissing possible alternatives as not protecting in-
dividual rights and the international process); Wolfenson, The U.S. Courts and the
Treatment of Suspects Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 705, 744 (1990) (objecting to the consideration of individual interests as
secondary to those of the violated state).
220. M. BASSlOUNI, supra note 1, at 239; see also supra notes 176-84 and accom-
panying text (discussing the impact of international kidnapping on state territorial soy-
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right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.221 It also does not
necessarily further international due process and fairness or preserve
the integrity of the international process.2 22 Without incorporating all
these concerns into the formula, the threat to world order created by
international kidnapping remains.223
There is little doubt, however, that by promoting cooperation
amongst states in this area, the threat to stability is substantially allevi-
ated.224 Additionally, by placing greater burdens on the government to
pursue extradition, and in the case of failure, requiring it to justify
resorting to abductions, the rights of the individual and the integrity of
the international process are indirectly enhanced by limiting the use of
this procedure.225 Overall, a system which intensifies judicial supervi-
sion over international kidnapping would largely reduce the tension of
the present system and would allow the process to evolve with the ex-
panding concept of a "new world order. ' 226
ereignty); supra note 215 (noting that acquiescence by a state to an abduction heals
violations of international law).
221. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note I, at 239; see also supra notes 185-89 and accom-
panying text (addressing violations of international human rights laws resulting from
international kidnapping). The problem of human rights violations also includes torture
and abuse of the individual while in captivity. Wolfenson, supra note 219, at 738-46;
see also, supra notes 49-85 and accompanying text (examining the Toscanino excep-
tion and cases of abusive kidnapping that courts have labeled as not "shocking to the
conscience").
222. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1. at 239.
223. Id. Bassiouni divides the "threats to minimum world order" created when one
state acts without the cooperation or consent of another into three fields: violations of
territorial sovereignty, violations of individual rights, and violations of the integrity of
the international process. Id. Bassiouni contends that with mutual cooperation and con-
sent the threats would be reduced to two: violations of international rights and viola-
tions threatening the integrity of the international process. Id. Bassiouni concludes that
although cooperation is less disruptive to world order, all interests are better advanced
by reformulating the extradition system. Id.
224. Id.; see also, supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text (examining the viola-
tions of international law arising from abductions of fugitives abroad and the threat
they pose to international order).
225. See supra notes 176-88 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of virtu-
ally unregulated abductions on the international system, international law, and the
movement toward greater recognition of international human rights).
226. Id; see also M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 239 (concluding that the protec-
tion of a state's territorial-sovereignty by cooperation would reduce the tensions uncon-
trolled abductions have created); infra notes 223-25 (referring to President Bush's
proclamations regarding the need for a "new world order-).
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CONCLUSION
A wealth of cases spanning over a century provide strong support for
the application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine in the United States law.
227
Attempts to limit the application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine to uphold
international law and human rights2 28 had little effect on remedying
the abuses in the system. 229 The Noriega case is just one example
where the United States has seized an accused individual who subse-
quently and unsuccessfully challenged the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine as in-
consistent with the modern perception of international comity.230
Despite judicial consensus, however, challenges to the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine should gain increasing favor in the future, given the ex-
panding concept of a "new world order";2 31 a world that would strictly
adhere to the principles of international law, including respect for terri-
torial sovereignty.23 2 In support of this goal, President Bush recently
proclaimed the need for such a "new world order" in which the "rule of
law" is supported and aggression is condemned.23 3 It is ironic that these
statements were made by President Bush in denouncing the invasion of
227. See supra notes 12-43 and accompanying text (discussing the historical devel-
opment of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
228. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267, 267, 277 (1974) (divesting
jurisdiction over the defendant where the government's abduction was considered inva-
sive of the defendant's rights and contrary to international law).
229. See Lujan, 510 F.2d at 66 (limiting the decision in Toscanino to cases where
torture inflicted on the defendant was shocking to the conscience); United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the Toscanino exception that
Lujan created in favor of the strict Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
230. See supra notes 86-152 and accompanying text (reviewing and analyzing the
arguments used in the Noriega case to deny United States jurisdiction).
231. See Bush, supra note 209, at A20 (outlining the need to prohibit international
abductions of fugitives to promote the law of nations).
232. See id. (advocating adherence to the "rule of law" particularly with respect to
the territorial sovereignty of nation states); see also supra notes 190-96 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the effects of fugitive abductions on the territorial sovereignty of
the asylum states).
233. Bush, supra note 208, at A20. In discussing how the Persian Gulf crisis has
given the world a "rare opportunity" to promote greater cooperation, President Bush
stated:
Out of these troubled times, our ... objective-a new world order-can emerge:
a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and
more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world...
can prosper and live in harmony .... Today [a] new world is struggling to be
born .... A world were the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world
in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice.
Id. In this speech, Bush also emphatically pledged to "support the rule of law" and
"stand up to aggression." Id.
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Kuwait by Iraq, which took place only eight months after the United
States' invasion of Panama.
2 34
Perhaps the Persian Gulf War will give renewed strength to the idea
that the United States must serve as a model for this "new world or-
der. ' 235 Thus, as a necessity, the United States would have to abandon
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine in favor of stricter rules. 236 There are alterna-
tives, such as a complete ban on abductions and enhanced judicial su-
pervision of the abduction process. 237 In varying degrees, these mea-
sures would contribute to the movement toward global cooperation. 238
The duty, therefore, lies in the hands of the courts and the legislature
to initiate the changes necessary to reconcile United States laws with
international expectations.239
234. See Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al (recounting the details of the United
States invasion of Panama).
235. See Bush, supra note 208, at A20 (indicating the United States rule ofr"new
world order").
236. See supra notes 198-226 and accompanying text (suggesting alternatives to




239. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining the roles of the courts
and legislature in adopting alternatives to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
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